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Not the First: Myths of Jaws 
Sheldon Hall 
 
Looking up references to Jaws in a couple of dozen standard sources produces a remarkable 
degree of consensus: certain themes recur ceaselessly. These themes, which are found in 
scholarly studies as well as in popular journalistic and fan-based accounts of the film, are so 
insistent that they form a coherent, consistent mythology – a mythology in the sense of both a 
plausible narrative or ‘biographical legend’ (assuming a film can be said to have a biography) 
and a set of beliefs that have become taken for granted as a way of discussing the film and 
understanding its significance. In particular they revolve around a set of supposed ‘firsts’ that 
are the subject of this chapter. 
The notion that Jaws was a watershed marking the end of one era (the ‘New 
Hollywood’ of auteurs and quasi-art films financed and released by major studios) and the 
beginning of another (the New ‘New Hollywood’ of big-budget action pictures and 
technological spectacle), recurs throughout both the critical literature and the popular 
discourse: 
 
‘If any single film marked the arrival of the New Hollywood, it was Jaws, the 
Spielberg-directed thriller that recalibrated the profit potential of the Hollywood hit, 
and redefined its status as a marketable commodity and cultural phenomenon as well. 
The film brought an emphatic end to Hollywood’s five-year recession, while ushering 




‘If there was a single day when the era ended, it was June 21, 1975, just after two 
landmark films had appeared on the respective covers of Time and Newsweek. 
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Newsweek’s cover film was Nashville, thought by some to be the film of the decade, 




‘The film created a sensation and with it Universal initiated the era of the blockbuster 




‘Jaws was the first big-budget Hollywood film to be given both saturation television 




‘Jaws (1975) was the first proto-blockbuster to deploy exploitation pre-release 




‘The reputation of Jaws as the seminal blockbuster, as we know that term today, is 
beyond dispute. This was the start of the event movie; this was where the marketing 




‘At mid-decade, Steven Spielberg’s much-delayed production Jaws redefined the 
meaning of a blockbuster in the modern era. It was the first studio-planned national 
wide release, with a TV saturation ad campaign, licensing, and merchandising. It was 





‘Jaws was the first in a new genre, the summer blockbuster movie. [...] It marked a 






‘For many, the release of Jaws in 1975 constitutes the true birth of New Hollywood. 
A huge film in so many ways, not least its box office receipts, Jaws has been credited 
with inventing the concept of the summer blockbuster, the must-see “event” movie 
cut to the measure of the big screen, a sure-fire draw that would take families away 




 ‘In 1975, Steven Spielberg’s thriller Jaws ushered in a new era of filmmaking when it 





‘It was the first film to break the $100 million mark in box office takings and, for two 
years (up until the release of Star Wars in 1977), it remained the most successful box 









‘Jaws proved to be a genuine industry watershed, marking the birth of the New 
Hollywood in several crucial ways. [...] Jaws sparked a widespread industry recovery 




Synthesising the above-quoted accounts (which could no doubt be added to exponentially), 
five main themes, or myths, emerge as standard. Jaws is said to be the:  
 
1. First film to gross $100 million at the U.S. box office 
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2. First blockbuster movie  
3. First summer blockbuster 
4. First big-budget major-studio film to be TV-advertised 
5. First big-budget major-studio film to open wide 
 
Each of these claims contains a grain of truth otherwise they would not have gained such 
strong purchase as they have. But they should not be accepted at face value. My own position 
echoes another comment by Thomas Schatz (author of the first and last of the above 
quotations), when at one point in his seminal 1993 article on ‘The New Hollywood’ he noted 
in passing of Jaws: ‘In many ways, the film simply confirmed or consolidated various 
existing industry trends and practices.’
14
 This seems to me to get at the truth of the matter. 
Contrary to the mythology, Jaws did not appear out of nowhere to start a new and 
unprecedented cinematic ethos; rather, it emerged directly or indirectly out of industry 
practices with a long prior history which it refined, reworked or – to use a common current 
term – rebooted. I want therefore to develop and expand upon Schatz’s insight by taking each 
of the above five myths in turn and attempting to demonstrate how they are all at best 
exaggerations, at worst distortions, of longer developments in commercial distribution, 
exhibition and promotion of which Jaws was as much a culmination as a breakthrough. 
 
1. First film to gross $100 million at the U.S. box office 
 
The figure of $100 million has a talismanic significance in accounts of Jaws. It is offered as 
tangible, self-explanatory proof of the film’s importance, condensed into an easily-
comprehended figure. Thus a multi-authored volume claims that ‘Jaws became the first film 
in motion picture history to earn over $100 million’ and Warren Buckland states that it was 
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‘the first film to break the $100 million mark in box office takings’.
15
 Douglas Gomery tells 
us more specifically that it ‘earned more than $100 million at the box office in six months’, 
while Justin Wyatt notes that subsequently ‘$100 million became a benchmark for the 
blockbuster.’
16
 But $100 million in what, exactly? What does this magical figure actually 
betoken? 
In fact, Jaws was not the first film to gross $100 million at the box office. Rather, it 
was the first to earn $100 million in distributor rentals from the domestic, i.e. North 
American (U.S. and Canadian), market. Grosses are the monies taken at theatre box offices 
before any deductions by exhibitors or ‘off-the-top’ disbursements to revenue participants 
(such as stars with a cut of the gross from ‘the first dollar’). Rentals are the proportion of 
box-office takings – a proportion which may vary from one film to another, from one cinema 
to another or indeed from one week of a film’s release to another – that are passed on to the 
distributor. These are the revenues available to pay off the film’s production, distribution and 
marketing costs, as well as the distributor’s fees, interest on the production loan and 
numerous other charges and expenses. Before the collection of national data directly from 
cinemas, there was not always a reliable way of knowing a film’s total theatre earnings. In the 
late stages of a film’s release (when bookings would be made for the payment of flat fees 
rather than a percentage of takings, as was common in early runs) theatres might not bother to 
report their takings to distributors, so there might be no accurate record of total ticket sales.  
Until the late 1990s therefore, unless particular theatres were under discussion it was 
standard practice for trade journals such as Variety to refer to rentals rather than grosses 
because they provided a clearer index of a film’s potential profitability. But because modern 
sources tend to cite grosses rather than rentals (a concept that is less easily understood than 
combined ticket sales), figures from the past which refer to rentals are often mistaken as 
grosses and vice versa. Variety’s A.D. Murphy noted in an article specifically related to Jaws:  
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‘It is a common error in and out of the trade to confuse b.o. [grosses] with rentals. 
Boxoffice figures are meaningful in the early stages of release of a film in order to 
gauge its initial impact in given situations at a given time. But over time, rentals 




Web sites such as the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) and Wikipedia are especially prone to 
this confusion, mixing up the different types of data or failing to identify which is which, and 
sometimes multiplying rental figures to estimate grosses without being explicit about doing 
so. In one of his later pieces, ‘Tom’ (sic) Schatz is again clearer than most commentators in 
noting that Jaws was ‘the first film to gross over $200 million at the box office and to return 
over $100 million in rental receipts to its distributor – still the measure of a blockbuster hit’.
18
 
As Michael Coate has observed, several films before Jaws had earned a domestic box-
office gross of $100 million in the U.S. and Canada, beginning with The Sound of Music 
(1965) and followed by Gone with the Wind (first released in 1939, but surpassing $100 
million thanks to its 1967 reissue), The Godfather (1972), The Sting (1973) and The Exorcist 
(1973).
19
 The Sound of Music was also the first film to earn over $100 million in world 
rentals. These five were the benchmark predecessors that Jaws had to beat in order to achieve 
its record revenues (however they were calibrated). Universal made a point of this by taking 
out a front-page advertisement in Variety each time one of them was surpassed until Jaws 
took the top spot from The Godfather on 5 September 1975. The advertisement noting this 
milestone also listed the domestic rentals of the earlier films as reported by Variety at the start 
of the year (but not of Jaws itself): The Exorcist, $66,300,000; The Sting, $68,450,000; Gone 






Variety reported in its news columns that Jaws had passed the $100 million gross 
milestone on 23 August 1975, the film’s fifty-ninth day of release, when Universal claimed 
the domestic theatre gross stood at $100,375,045.
21
 But the studio declined to disclose rental 
figures at this stage. Murphy predicted in December 1975 that Jaws would be the first film to 
reach $200 million in worldwide rentals, but it was not until Variety’s year-end report in 
January 1976 that Variety estimated a domestic rental over $100,000,000: the initial figure 
published was $102,650,000, which two weeks later was amended to $104,000,000.
22
 At this 
point the journal also reported that Jaws had surpassed The Godfather to achieve the highest 
worldwide rental to date, with a global total of $132,000,000 by January 1976 (overseas 
release having started in October 1975, but with most territories including the UK opening in 
December).
23
 Updates of the film’s total domestic rentals regularly appeared in the paper’s 
annual charts of ‘All-Time Film Rental Champs’, reflecting additional revenues from 
reissues, and in January 1985 Variety issued its most precise U.S./Canadian rental figure yet: 
$129,961,081.
24
 This was doubtless based on information received directly from the 
distributor, as other Universal titles were similarly updated with exact figures. They included 
Steven Spielberg’s E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial (1982), the first film to earn a domestic rental 
over $200 million, with a reported total at this stage of $209,976,989. 
 
2. First blockbuster movie  
Douglas Gomery has been especially insistent that Jaws was ‘the first true blockbuster’ and 
that with its release MCA-Universal and its chairman Lew Wasserman had ‘initiated the era 
of the Hollywood blockbuster’.
25
 But if that was the case, one wonders what people had been 
talking about when referring to blockbusters over the previous three decades. In fact, by 





 Jaws may have modified understanding of the concept, but it certainly 
did not create the category of blockbuster. 
The word itself was first used in 1943, both extra-cinematically (it originated as the 
nickname given to a large bomb capable of destroying a city block, first deployed militarily 
in that year) and in its colloquial application to movies. Initially ‘blockbuster’ was used as a 
thematically appropriate metaphor to describe war-related films, beginning most appositely 
with RKO’s Bombardier (1943). But after World War II, from about 1948 onward, it was 
used analogically to denote films of considerable (commercial) power, size and impact. It 
therefore became added to a lexicon of terms which historically have been used to refer to 
films of particular industrial importance because of their exceptional cost, the exceptional 
marketing strategies used to promote them or their exceptional box-office success. Earlier 
such terms have included feature, special, superspecial and roadshow, among others, most of 
which have fallen into disuse except by film historians.
27
 
Moreover, in the 1950s ‘blockbuster’ came to refer not just to a particular kind of film 
but to a whole industrial strategy associated with the regular production of big-budget, 
heavily-promoted films, distinct from more routine offerings and differentiated from other 
cultural and entertainment forms such as television (though the word blockbuster was 
sometimes used to describe these other forms too).
28
 This strategy came to define the 
postwar, ‘post-classical’ or ‘post-studio’ era, reflecting changes in leisure patterns and in film 
consumption, as well as new or enhanced distribution and exhibition modes, such as the 
increased number of films presented as special ‘roadshow’ attractions in the late 1950s and 
1960s. Traditional genres like the western, war film and musical were upgraded with higher 
budgets and technological enhancements such as colour and widescreen formats, while at the 
same time more marginal, mostly low-budget genres such as horror and science fiction 
experienced a resurgence with an increased number of productions, often made independently 
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and sometimes deemed ‘exploitation’ pictures for the way in which heavy promotion aimed 
to turn them into mainstream successes. The taken-for-grantedness of blockbusters as both a 
production category and an industrial strategy can be seen in the pervasive presence of the 
word in magazine articles and trade-paper reports throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with titles 




Thus, when Jaws made its appearance in mid-1975 there was a ready-made 
conceptual category in which to place it rather than its inventing a new one. Indeed, there 
were several such categories available: another was ‘disaster film’, the most recent generic 
variant of the blockbuster, in which all-star casts were consumed by conflagrations or caught 
up in mid-air collisions, natural cataclysms and all manner of collective crises. Jaws, with its 
scenario of a community beset by an oceanic threat on its doorstep, leading to scenes of mass 
panic on a beach, fitted this established template also. Although there were significant recent 
predecessors such as Krakatoa, East of Java (1969), Airport (1970) and The Poseidon 
Adventure (1972), the disaster film really established itself as a recognised industry trend in 
the autumn of 1974, which saw the release in close succession of Airport 1975 (1974), 
Earthquake (1974) and The Towering Inferno (1974), all spectacular successes. Earthquake 
and the Airport films were produced and released by MCA-Universal, which must clearly 
have known blockbusters when it saw them (as it had also done the previous year with The 
Sting). Some critics placed Jaws squarely within this disaster cycle; writing in the UK, six 
months after its U.S. opening, Gordon Gow noted that the film was ‘on a par in masochistic 
magnetism with The Towering Inferno’, and Tom Milne commented: ‘While it hardly merits 
the status of No. 1 box-office Jaws is a perfectly acceptable, and sometimes genuinely 
exciting, entry in the disaster stakes.’
30
 James Monaco’s Sight and Sound review focused on 
the film’s commercial achievement, identifying it with an already-established pattern: 
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Hollywood, he noted, was ‘becoming increasingly oriented towards the large-budget, pre-
sold adventure movie’.
31
 In other words, Jaws was continuing a trend, rather than creating 
one. 
 
3. First summer blockbuster 
The argument in favour of Jaws being the ‘first’ summer blockbuster is likely a response to 
the setting and subject matter of the film itself as much as to its seasonal timing. The story of 
course takes place at a coastal holiday resort during a summer vacation, with the key beach 
set-piece occurring over the July Independence Day weekend. This synergy was surely not 
lost on Universal, whose decision to open the film on 20 June and to design a release pattern 
which kept it in circulation throughout July and August was certainly a triumph of scheduling 
and marketing. But as we shall see later, the success of that strategy depended partly on 
limiting the film’s release – again, contrary to the mythology. 
The summer months (especially July and August) were traditionally regarded as a 
lean time by distributors and exhibitors. Throughout the ‘classical’ studio era, the distributors 
designated their business year by seasons rather than by calendar year, and for most 
companies the annual season began in September and ended in August (Twentieth Century-
Fox was an exception, organising its business year from August to July). Thus the optimum 
time to launch the new season’s lineup was in the fall (television’s annual seasons are 
comparable in this regard). Exhibitors, however, often complained that they were denied a 
steady stream of top pictures throughout the year and were sometimes left with a product 
shortage in the summer months, when they were forced to play out the end-of-season period 
with ‘extended runs, repeat engagements or reissues’ unless the distributors decided to open 
some of their new season’s product early.
32
 Even the industry’s all-time peak year for 
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attendance, 1946, was affected by a summer slump, though in its case this was ‘merely a drop 
in biz from super-sensational to mildly terrific’.
33
 
Summer was also, of course, the holiday period, when leisure-seekers enjoyed 
outdoor activity in preference to movies. The first Monday in September is a national 
holiday, Labor Day, and this is often seen as marking the end of the summer vacation period. 
But hot weather also meant problems for many theatres, particularly those in southern and 
mid-western states, which often closed in summer not only to allow their own staff a vacation 
but also because sweltering heat made some indoor theatres inhospitable. Even Broadway 
first-run houses could struggle in a heat wave. 
Some of these conditions changed over time, however. The spread of air conditioning 
was credited by Variety in 1936 for a major upturn in summer business, with ‘air-cooled 
theatres’ offering a positive alternative to outdoor heat (‘Instead of a bugaboo, hot weather 
has become an asset.’).
34
 That summer saw the release of one of the decade’s biggest hits, 
MGM’s San Francisco (1936), which opened in July and played its metropolitan first runs 
through August. Its total domestic rental of $2,868,000 was surpassed among 1930s releases 
to that point only by the same studio’s The Great Ziegfeld (1936). The following summer 




These films also reflected the industry’s, and the country’s, emergence from the 
Depression, though they were followed by a further recession. During the wartime boom 
years, exceptional conditions led to an alleviation of expected patterns of a summer drop-off, 
which Variety attributed to ‘distributors’ willingness to release top product immediately 
instead of waiting for the start of the new season; high wages in war-related industries, 
benefiting nearby communities; [and] shortage of gasoline keeping holiday-makers at 
home’.
36
 The 1946 ‘seasonal dip’ prior to a record fall could also be explained by local 
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The related postwar rises of car ownership and the drive-in theatre help account for 
the increased importance of the summer season in the 1950s and 1960s. Open-air theatres 
after sundown attracted family groups as well as out-of-school teenagers on dates. While 
most roadshows were launched in the spring or fall seasons, films aimed at the family market 
(for example, Walt Disney’s) were often released in the summer and other holiday periods, 
when they found a ready audience of pre-teens and parents. Big-budget films which went into 
wide release in summer months included United Artists’ Trapeze (1956), which earned the 
‘largest single week’s gross in the history of the motion picture business’ when generally 
released in 405 theatres in July 1956 following pre-release runs the previous month; and 
UA’s The Vikings (1958), which after opening at Easter went wide during the summer, with 
‘1,000 bookings aimed for during three weeks, mainly to break around [the] July 4 holiday’.
38
 
These two films were released with domestic inventories of 600 and 700 prints, respectively. 
Summer was also often the period when many roadshow films went into general release – 
that is, when they became more widely available to regular exhibitors after completing their 
exclusive, reserved-seat runs in metropolitan showcase theatres. For example, The Longest 
Day (1962), launched as a roadshow in select engagements in October 1962, enjoyed its ‘first 
wave’ of general release on 450 prints in summer 1963, followed by a period of withdrawal 
and then a further wave of 450 theatres in June 1964.
39
 
By 1957, in fact, the previous received wisdom on the relative ‘doldrums’ of the 
summer had been reversed. In June of that year, Daily Variety reported that ‘the trade is 
anxiously awaiting the anticipated summer pickup. The months of July and August have 
traditionally become the peak business period for the motion picture industry’.
40
 This was 
despite the fact that air conditioning, now common in homes, was less of an attraction in 
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theatres than it had been twenty years before and despite the increased number of pastimes 
that offered alternative distractions. One of the few advantages that cinema had over 
competing leisure options was that the summer months were now TV’s doldrums. 
 
4. First big-budget major-studio film to be TV-advertised 
Although the Hollywood studios initially regarded the postwar advent of network television 
mainly as a threat through its competition for audiences and were slow to exploit the new 
medium as an opportunity for advertising and promotion, some publicists recognised its 
potential early on. One was Terry Turner, who as head of exploitation at RKO used 
advertising on local TV stations to sell the 1952 reissue of King Kong (1933) and helped it to 
gross more than twice than on its original release; significantly, those territories where TV 
was available yielded better results than those where it was not.
41
 Subsequently as a freelance 
Turner oversaw many similar campaigns and in trade press articles he advocated the greater 
use of television as a promotional tool. In 1959, Turner noted that television advertising had 
still not yet been fully exploited and in particular that the film industry had ‘made very little 




Some studios did this selectively in the 1960s, using national TV ads as well as local 
ones, though the latter were more common. A 1965 trade advertisement by Twentieth 
Century-Fox proclaimed ‘the first sustained, continuing buy by a major motion picture 
company’, involving 189 one-minute commercials aired every week during ‘Major-League 
Championship Baseball’ and ‘Nightlife’ on the national ABC TV network. Among the films 
thus promoted were such major releases as The Sound of Music, Those Magnificent Men in 
Their Flying Machines, The Agony and the Ecstasy, Von Ryan’s Express (all 1965) and Our 
Man Flint (1966). With this strategy, Fox claimed that ‘a new era was born in motion picture 
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advertising! […] Here at last is the pre-sell… the deep-sell… the continuing-sell exhibitors 
have been crying for’.
43
 This was, however, advertising on only one network on a limited 
number of shows. 
According to another trade advertisement ten years later, Universal’s campaign for 
Jaws was ‘the Biggest National prime-time T.V. Spot campaign in Motion Picture History!’, 
with twenty-three thirty-second spots aired at prime time every night between 17-20 June on 
all three national networks.
44
 Unusually, exhibitors were required to contribute to the costs of 
this TV advertising as part of their bids for the right to play the picture in its opening 
engagements.
45
 Undoubtedly, this was the most extensive and expensive TV-spot campaign 
to date, with a reported $700,000 spent on TV ads. Even so, it was not the first. In fact, 
Universal itself had already been using similar TV-advertising strategies with recent releases 
such as Airport 1975, as had other studios with other films. But the most important precursor 




That it was not a foolproof method of promotion was demonstrated by the next major 
release on which Universal attempted to repeat its own formula. The western Rooster 
Cogburn (1975), bringing back John Wayne in his Oscar-winning role from Paramount’s 
True Grit (1969) and casting him for the first and only time opposite Katharine Hepburn, was 
the subject of a similar promotional and distribution campaign as Jaws. A trade advertisement 





Prime-time TV spot campaign 





Yet when it opened in October the same year, Rooster Cogburn’s box-office performance 
was mediocre, earning only $4.8 million in domestic rentals. Effective as it was when allied 
to the right product, national TV advertising and the other marketable ingredients did not 
produce a magic formula that could be applied to any film. Variety’s year-end report noted 





 5. First big-budget major-studio film to open wide 
‘Saturation’ releases are commonly associated with so-called exploitation pictures – that is to 
say, films whose success depends on the marketising (exploiting) of topical or sensational 
subject matter, rather than those which are merely ‘exploitative’ in the everyday sense. 
Industry wisdom has it that wide-release distribution and exhibition strategies were 
traditionally used for low-budget stinkers, aiming to make a quick hit-and-run before word 
got around about their poor quality or failure to deliver on the promises of their advertising. 
While undoubtedly there was some truth in this, it was not the only reason for wide releasing, 
which has a longer and more complex history than might be supposed. Another reason for 
wide or ‘instant’ releases was to capitalise on presumed ‘want-to-see’, either created 
artificially through elaborate promotional campaigns or because the ingredients of the film 
already had built-in public awareness by being ‘pre-sold’ – for example, through the presence 
of an established star, the use of extensive pre-release publicity or by being based on a well-
known literary property. In any of these cases, there would be an audience ready and waiting 






There were two basic kinds of wide release: intensive regional saturation, in which a 
large number of prints and theatre bookings was targeted on a particular area (such as a city, 
state or broader region); and simultaneous nationwide releasing, in which a large number of 
theatres in different areas across the country gained ‘instant’ access to a film. Among the 
earliest films to be given local saturation bookings were Charlie Chaplin’s short comedies for 
the Mutual Corporation. Beginning with The Floorwalker (1916), between 200 and 300 prints 
(several times the number for an ordinary short or feature) were used for each of the sixteen 
Mutual pictures made by the star comedian in 1916-17. In the case of the three-reeler A 
Dog’s Life (1918), released by First National, 160 prints were used in Greater New York 
alone, while 200 prints were used for territorial bookings of Chaplin’s first full-length 
feature, The Kid (1921).
50
 In the early sound era, Warner Bros. and RKO Radio both 
established a policy of ‘day and date’ releases in which around 300 prints of new sound films 
such as Warners’ The Desert Song (1929) and RKO’s Cimarron (1931) were made available 




The seemingly antithetical distribution strategies of roadshowing (associated 
primarily with prestige pictures) and saturation releasing were sometimes used in alternation 
for particular films, depending on the territory or the stage of release. David O. Selznick’s 
epic western Duel in the Sun (1946) opened as an exclusive roadshow in Los Angeles in late 
1946, but was saturation-released the following summer in territories such as Greater New 
York, Texas and California. Shortly afterwards, Twentieth Century-Fox opened its bestseller 
adaptation Forever Amber (1947) nationwide with 475 prints, reported as one of the largest 
print orders to that time. Both of these films were successively the most expensive films yet 
made, each costing more than Gone with the Wind (1939), though neither enjoyed much 
critical acclaim.  
17 
 
Most major studios used both regional saturation and wide national releases 
throughout the 1950s, often for horror and science-fiction pictures such as Warners’ The 
Beast from 20,000 Fathoms (1953), which opened in 614 theatres in its first two weeks of 
release.
52
 But westerns and other films with rural settings were also often given saturation 
treatment in the south and mid-west: Warner Bros. claimed a record 651 simultaneous 
openings for The Boy from Oklahoma (1954).
53
 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, showman 
and producer-distributor Joseph E. Levine specialised in large-scale releases of Italian 
costume adventures and Japanese creature features, supported by extravagant advertising 
campaigns; it is probably pictures such as these – most notably Hercules (1958) – that are 
responsible for the common association of wide releases with lowbrow trash. But Levine later 
applied the same principle to big-budget pictures such as the Harold Robbins adaptation The 
Carpetbaggers (1964), released nationwide by Paramount in over 700 prints to considerable 
box-office success, though again little esteem.
54
 Some companies even opted for 
simultaneous global first runs. MGM’s The V.I.P.s (1963) was planned for simultaneous 
release in 2,000 theatres in 750 cities around the world, which would have made it the 
‘biggest mass release ever in film history’. Variety reported it as opening in ‘172 theatres in 
89 cities of 30 countries’ outside the U.S. and Canada.
55
 Five years later, Paramount’s 




Also in the mid-1960s, United Artists developed a strategy of multiple first runs, a 
policy it called Premiere Showcase, which was subsequently taken up by other distributors. It 
was used on a wide range of pictures, most successfully the James Bond series. The Bond 
films were typically released with 500-600 prints for the domestic market. Diamonds Are 
Forever (1971), for example, opened at the end of the year in 104 theatres in thirty-three U.S. 
Canadian territories, including twenty-eight theatres in New York and nineteen in New 
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Jersey, plus fifty-seven situations in twenty-five overseas cities.
57
 In the summer of 1973, UA 
struck 600 prints for the Bond film Live and Let Die (1973), 550 for the musical Tom Sawyer 
(1973) and 450 for the general release of Last Tango in Paris (1972), which had opened as a 
roadshow.
58
 Two years later, UA had 500 prints ready for the summer release of The Return 
of the Pink Panther (1975) while Jaws was waiting in the wings.
59
 But the widest 
simultaneous domestic release of any major-studio film until the 1980s came in May 1975. 
One month before the release of Jaws, Columbia’s Charles Bronson vehicle Breakout opened 
in more than 1,300 U.S. and Canadian theatres, in what a trade ad described as ‘the most 
spectacular saturation blitz of any motion picture’.
60
 
What is most remarkable about the wide release of Jaws, in the light of the claims 
often made about it and in the context of predecessors such as these, is that it could so easily 
have been much wider – that it was not, in fact, as wide as had initially been intended. There 
have been a number of published accounts, including Spielberg’s own, of the aftermath of the 
film’s second, enormously successful, public preview at Long Beach on 28 March 1975, 
attended by a cadre of Universal executives including MCA president Lew Wasserman.
61
 In a 
post-screening debriefing, Wasserman instructed his distribution staff to cut back on a release 
strategy planned to include around one thousand simultaneous theatre openings (the exact 
number varies from one account to another). Rather than saturating the market in order to 
ensure a quick return on investment, Wasserman wanted the film to remain in circulation 
throughout the summer, in extended engagements that would extract the maximum possible 
revenue from each booking. In order to do that, the number of bookings was substantially 
reduced from the initial estimate to avoid ‘milking’ the picture too quickly and thereby 
reducing its theatrical life. Those theatres eventually chosen to receive the picture in the first 
wave of openings (409 in the United States, fifty-five in Canada) had to guarantee a 
minimum twelve-week run. So although there were ultimately more than 1,000 prints in 
19 
 
domestic circulation, theatre engagements were added gradually throughout the summer and 
fall as the film gathered momentum rather than saturating the opening weeks. 
Wasserman’s motivation for this revised strategy was surely his recognition that, 
unlike a majority of exploitation pictures, Jaws delivered on the promise of its advertising, as 
manifested in the audience reaction that night. As a consequence, the wide-release strategy 
for big-budget studio pictures gained greater credibility, even if the film had not in fact 
introduced it. In the first of a still-continuing series of annual box-office commentaries 
published in the US magazine Film Comment, Stuart Byron drew specific attention to  
 
‘Universal’s unique distribution pattern for Jaws. It used to be that the opening of a 
movie everywhere at once was a signal to most of the public that the picture was a 
stiff […]. But in opening at 500 theatres in late June, Jaws was the ultimate 
beneficiary of a trend toward so-called “wide” openings, with attendant saturation 




 As a consequence of Jaws, Byron noted, ‘the psychological effects of this particular way of 
releasing a picture have been neutralized; the public accepts or rejects a film released this 
way, as the case may be. And this is an interesting development. It has been little noticed that 
the history of film distribution in America is the history of the neutralization of release 






If an ‘event movie’ is understood as meaning the kind of film which becomes a cultural 
phenomenon or a must-see attraction, then we need to look back as far as The Birth of a 
20 
 
Nation (1915) for the most significant predecessor of Jaws. But if we restrict our attention to 
the New Hollywood era, then much of what has been claimed for Jaws can also be said, in 
some respects more convincingly, of one of the immediately preceding blockbusters against 
which its performance was often compared: The Godfather.  
Researcher Michael Coate has tabulated all 464 opening engagements of Jaws, in an 
online article which convincingly refutes the myth of its nationwide opening as representing 
any kind of record.
64
 Coate’s listings show that only five cities had simultaneous bookings in 
three or more theatres, and only thirteen had two concurrent runs; the rest were exclusive 
engagements in their respective communities, albeit in multiple cities and towns in each state. 
This was the Godfather policy almost exactly, on an only slightly larger scale. Paramount 
president Frank Yablans rejected the term ‘saturation’ as a description of his simultaneous 
national release strategy for The Godfather, which involved booking the film into a small 
number of theatres in each area for twelve-week runs to maximise potential. Beginning with 
around 400 engagements opening in February 1972, the film’s release expanded to involve 
around one thousand prints in circulation by the end of the year.
65
 This anticipated many of 
the key features of the Jaws distribution strategy, which has little in common with the kind of 
mass coverage, opening on a thousand or more screens, which only became commonplace in 
the 1980s and largely thanks to the influence of other films besides Jaws, including the 
remake of King Kong (1976).
66
 
Jaws, then, had many ancestors; it borrowed from the promotional and distribution 
strategies developed for many films over the previous three decades, refining, enhancing, 
combining and synthesising them with peculiar effectiveness. Not only in the way it did this 
but also in the spectacular degree of its commercial success, Jaws undoubtedly set a new 
benchmark for box-office performance and persuaded subsequent films’ distributors to 
emulate its example. It anticipated many later developments in, for example, the increased 
21 
 
importance of wide releases of big-budget films in the summer and other holiday seasons. 
More than most films, it has served as a reference point for contemporary blockbuster 
cinema. It is important, influential, impressive and of continuing relevance. But it was not the 
first. 
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